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Just Luck: An Experimental Study of  
Risk-Taking and Fairness†
By Alexander W. Cappelen, James Konow,  
Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden*
Choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income 
and wealth in society. This paper reports the results of the first 
experiment, to our knowledge, to study fairness views about risk-
taking, specifically whether such views are based chiefly on ex ante 
opportunities or on ex post outcomes. We find that, even though 
many participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities, most 
favor some redistribution ex post. Many participants also make 
a distinction between ex post inequalities that reflect differences 
in luck and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices. 
These findings apply to both stakeholders and impartial spectators. (JEL D63, D81, H23)
People make choices involving risk in all spheres of life, and the outcomes of 
these choices fundamentally affect the distribution of income and wealth in society. 
At the same time, people often disagree about the fair allocation of gains and losses 
that inevitably result from risky choices. One can distinguish two questions in this 
regard. First, how should gains and losses be distributed between risk-takers and 
those who avoid risk? Second, how should gains and losses be distributed between 
lucky and unlucky risk-takers? Discussions about compensation schemes, health 
care policies, and the regulation of financial markets suggest that these two ques-
tions arise in a wide range of contexts.1
1 Although we make no claims that our study reflects directly any specific economic or political phenomena, 
we do believe it does speak to important and commonly shared concerns. For example, arguments advanced in 
the debates over bailouts of distressed industries in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis provide examples 
of our two questions and how they are framed in this paper. On the first question concerning risk-takers and risk-
avoiders, a group of 192 prominent economists wrote an open letter to Congress arguing that it was unfair for 
taxpayers, most of whom had not been involved in risky investments, to finance the bailout (“Economists of the
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How to deal fairly with risk-taking is often cast in terms of whether to focus on 
ex ante opportunities or ex post outcomes.2 The conflict between these two views 
is most clearly seen when people have equal opportunities. In such cases, the 
ex ante view, which focuses on initial opportunities, provides a fairness argu-
ment for no redistribution of gains and losses from risk-taking. The ex post view, 
on the other hand, focuses on outcomes, and considers it fair to eliminate all 
inequalities resulting from risk-taking. Clearly, such fairness considerations need 
to be balanced against efficiency concerns, but this conflict illustrates how fair-
ness views about risk-taking could significantly impact the support for and, con-
sequently, the design of public policies. Such views are arguably also important 
for understanding behavior not only in a policy context but also in a wide range 
of other economic contexts where agents are motivated, at least partially, by fair-
ness considerations.
This paper reports the results from the first experiment, to our knowledge, to study 
fairness views about risk-taking.3 The study focuses on cases in which it is costly 
to avoid risk; thus, we do not consider gambling or other risk-seeking behavior. The 
experiment consisted of a risk-taking phase followed by a distribution phase. In the 
risk-taking phase, participants faced a sequence of choices between a risky and a 
safe alternative, where the value of the safe alternative varied. In the distribution 
phase, for each risk-taking situation, the participants were anonymously paired with 
other participants who had faced the same choice, and the earnings of each pair were 
pooled. In all distributive situations, therefore, there was ex ante equality in oppor-
tunities but possibly ex post inequalities in individual earnings. The participants 
were then informed about the choices and the outcomes of the risk-taking phase for 
both parties and asked to distribute the total earnings.
This design enables us to focus on our two main questions. First, do people in 
situations of equal opportunities deviate from the ex ante fairness view and redis-
tribute gains and losses from risk-taking? Second, do people make a distinction 
between ex post inequalities that reflect differences in luck and ex post inequalities 
that reflect differences in choices? We also consider an intermediate fairness posi-
tion, which we refer to as choice egalitarianism. This fairness view holds people 
World, Unite!” by Joe Nocera. New York Times, September 25, 2008. http://executivesuite.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2008/09/25/economists-of-the-world-unite/). The second question of lucky and unlucky risk-takers was important 
in the discussions surrounding the possible establishment of an industry-financed bailout fund, where a key concern 
was whether or not it was fair that lucky risk-takers partially financed the losses of unlucky risk-takers.
2 There is also an extensive theoretical literature on the normative question of how to evaluate risky situations. 
See, among others, Harsanyi (1955); Diamond (1967); Hammond (1981); Fried (2003); Harel, Safra, and Segal 
(2005); and Fleurbaey (2010).
3 Various recent experimental and theoretical studies have examined possible trade-offs between the desire to 
achieve a fair distribution and the desire to avoid risk (Babický 2003; Babický, Ortmann, and Van Koten 2010; Brennan 
et al. 2008; Brock, Lange, and Ozbay, forthcoming; Krawczyk 2010; Krawczyk and Le Lec 2010; Magdalou, Dubois, 
and Nguyen-Van 2009; Fudenberg and Levine 2011). The experiments of Zizzo and Oswald (2001) and Daniel John 
Zizzo (2003, 2004) come closest to our study. In a series of intriguing experiments, subjects first choose how much 
to invest in a risky gamble, earnings are distributed and then subjects can (and often do) destroy the earnings of other 
participants. Our study differs in several respects, but, most importantly, we place no restrictions on how the partici-
pants choose to distribute the money in the distribution phase and this allows us to focus on the fairness preferences 
of individuals rather than on envy. Brock, Lange, and Ozbay (forthcoming) is an interesting study showing that the 
propensity to give in a dictator game decreases if the transfer is risky. Finally, see also Shogren (1992) for an early 
experimental study of bargaining over ex ante lotteries and ex post rewards.
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responsible for their choices but not for their luck.4 Such a view would endorse 
ex post redistribution between lucky and unlucky risk-takers but not between risk-
takers and participants who choose the safe alternative. The design also allows us to 
study whether the attractiveness of the ex ante fairness view depends on how costly 
it is to avoid risks, as captured by the value of the safe alternative. A conjecture in 
this regard is that the ex ante position would be considered less appealing in cases 
where the safe alternative is very unattractive, and, as a result, the risky alternative 
appears virtually unavoidable.
In addition to the “stakeholders” described thus far, who made decisions about 
risk-taking and redistribution that affected their own earnings, we also randomly 
assigned some participants to be “spectators” in the experiment. The spectators did 
not make choices in the risk-taking phase but instead acted as third parties who were 
paid a fixed fee to allocate the total earnings of other subjects in the distribution 
phase. Specifically, spectators allocated the pooled earnings of pairs of stakeholders 
in a randomly selected subsample of the distributive situations. By comparing the 
behavior of the two groups, one can examine the extent to which the fairness views 
of stakeholders seem to deviate from the fairness views of impartial spectators. In 
particular, this allows us to study whether the involvement in the risk-taking phase 
makes stakeholders assign more importance to choices in the distribution phase. 
This comparison is also of considerable importance from a methodological point of 
view. Previous empirical research on the nature of social preferences has relied on 
both spectator (Charness and Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Konow, 
Saijo, and Akai 2009; Konow 2000, 2009) and stakeholder behavior (Cappelen et al. 
2007; Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Kurki 2004), but this is the first study to 
examine whether these two approaches generate the same conclusions about social 
preferences within a given experiment. Finally, it has also been argued that spectator 
judgments might be particularly relevant for normative analysis and policy evalua-
tion missing (e.g., Konow 2009).
Our analysis provides four main findings. First, we show that, although the ex ante 
fairness view garners the single largest share of support among the three candidates, 
most participants favor some ex post redistribution, even when, as here, people 
had the same ex ante opportunities. Second, we find that, among the participants 
who redistribute earnings, many make a distinction between ex post inequalities 
that result from different choices and ex post inequalities that result from differ-
ences in luck. Overall, most participants favor not equalizing ex post inequalities 
that result from different choices, but most also favor equalizing ex post inequali-
ties resulting from differences in luck among risk-takers. Third, we show that the 
appeal of the ex ante view is independent of how costly it is to avoid exposure to 
risk. Fourth, even though the choices of stakeholders clearly reflect a selfish motive, 
we find that stakeholders and spectators act on the same fairness views. Thus, the 
two approaches support the same set of conclusions about fairness preferences over 
the gains and losses from risk-taking.
4 This view has been discussed extensively in the philosophical literature (see Dworkin 1981a, b; Arneson 1989; 
Lippert-Rasmussen 2001; Fleurbaey 2002; Vallentyne 2002; and Fried 2003).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the experimental design. 
Section II analyzes the choices of spectators. Section III introduces a model of 
distributive choice, which we estimate for both spectators and stakeholders, and 
Section IV concludes.
I. Design and Procedures
We recruited participants among students at the Norwegian School of Economics. 
A total of 119 subjects participated in 4 sessions that lasted about 40 minutes and 
that all took place on the same day. Subjects were strongly incentivized in the exper-
iment and earned, on average, 472 Norwegian Kroner (NOK) or about $75, includ-
ing a 100 NOK show-up fee. The experiment was conducted in a computer lab using 
a web-based interface and was double-blind; i.e., neither subjects nor experimenters 
could associate decisions with particular subjects. Moreover, earnings were paid 
anonymously by wire using payment codes through an independent accounting divi-
sion, a fact that was communicated to all subjects.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to be 
either stakeholders (78 subjects) or spectators (41 subjects), and they remained in 
a single role for the duration of the experiment. There were two decision-making 
phases: a risk-taking phase and a distribution phase. Only stakeholders partici-
pated in the risk-taking phase, in which they were asked to choose between a 
safe alternative and a risky alternative in four different risk-taking situations. In 
all of the four cases, the risky alternative contained two equally likely outcomes 
of 800 NOK and 0 NOK. Hence, the expected value of the risky alternative was 
always 400 NOK. The safe alternative varied across the four situations and took on 
the values 400 NOK, 300 NOK, 200 NOK, or 25 NOK. The four situations were 
presented in random order. Before the stakeholders made their choices in the risk-
taking phase, they were told that a second phase would follow that concerned the 
distribution of earnings from the risk-taking phase, but they were not provided with 
any details of this phase.5
Table 1 provides an overview of the choices made by the 78 stakeholders in the 
risk-taking phase. Only seven participants made choices that reflected potentially 
risk-loving preferences. Hence, almost all participants were weakly risk averse, but 
none so risk averse as to choose the safe alternative when it had a value of 25 NOK. 
Considering the complete set of choices of each stakeholder, we observe that the 
preferences of all but five obey monotonicity; i.e., a subject who chose the risky 
alternative for a high value of the safe alternative also did so for lower values of the 
safe alternative.
In the distribution phase, stakeholders were anonymously and randomly paired 
with a sequence of eight other stakeholders.6 For each pair, one of the four situations 
5 We cannot rule out that knowledge about the distribution phase induced strategic risk-taking (Coate 1995) 
and, possibly, also affected the participants’ perceived ownership of the earnings. The fact that we find very similar 
results for stakeholders and spectators, however, suggests that the timing of information in itself did not affect the 
propensity to act on a particular fairness view in the distribution phase.
6 Double-blind anonymity and high stakes should allay concerns that our results are due to audience effects; i.e., 
effects on the behavior of decision-makers due to their being observed by other subjects or the experimenter (see, 
e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). We believe that this is particularly so for which fairness view to follow in the 
distributive situations, which is the main focus of the present paper.
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from the risk-taking phase was drawn randomly, and the stakeholder was asked 
to determine how the total earnings of the two stakeholders should be distributed 
among them. Before they made each choice, the participants were informed about 
the choices and outcomes of the risk-taking phase for both parties. Thus, there was 
no uncertainty about the source of inequality in earnings.7 Moreover, given that 
this was a one-shot experiment, the participants did not have to consider whether 
the distributive choices would affect future risk-taking choices. The distributive 
situations were presented in random order, and after making their decisions, the 
participants were given a final opportunity to revise any or all of them, if desired. 
Correspondingly, the spectators made eight distributive choices from a randomly 
selected subsample of the distributive situations faced by the stakeholders. The spec-
tators were provided with the same information as the stakeholders. In total, we have 
530 distributive situations with positive total earnings, 112 distributive situations 
where one stakeholder chose the risky alternative and the other stakeholder chose 
the safe alternative, 152 distributive situations where both stakeholders chose the 
safe alternative, and 266 distributive situations where both chose the risky alterna-
tive and at least one of them was lucky. Spectators made choices in 283 distributive 
situations with positive total earnings. All allocations were restricted to multiples of 
25 NOK.
At the beginning of the experiment, stakeholders were told that the computer 
would randomly choose one of the situations and one of the choices in this situation 
to determine their final outcome. Spectators received a fixed payment of 350 NOK 
unrelated to their decisions.
II. Ex Ante or Ex Post?
Table 2 reports some basic descriptive statistics from the distribution phase. We 
observe that stakeholders give away, on average, 23.5 percent of total earnings. 
Spectators choose an equal split more often than stakeholders, 55.5 percent ver-
sus 24.5 percent of the situations, and stakeholders take everything for themselves 
in 36.4 percent of the distributive situations. Overall, by comparing the earnings 
7 This rules out the possibility for heterogeneity in beliefs among the participants about the sources of differ-
ences in earnings, which has shown to be prevalent and of importance in dictator games where the participants lack 
information about the earning stage (Ray-Biel, Sheremeta, and Uler 2011).
Table 1—Risk Choices Made by Participants
Risk choice
Value of safe alternative Safe alternative Risky alternative Total
 25   0  78  78
200   5  73  78
300  28  50  78
400  71   7  78
104 208 312
Notes: The table reports the choices made by stakeholders in the risk-taking phase. For each 
value of the safe alternative, the table reports the number of stakeholders choosing the safe 
alternative and the risky alternative.
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before and after transfers, we observe a reduction in the Gini coefficient from 0.474 
to 0.440 for the decisions made by spectators, and an increase in the Gini coeffi-
cient from 0.483 to 0.560 for the decisions made by stakeholders.8 Thus, the pres-
ence of the selfish motive for the stakeholders makes them choose differently from 
the spectators.
To study the distributive choices of spectators in greater detail, we present histo-
grams of share given in different types of situations in panels A–F in Figure 1. We 
observe in panel A that the most common choice among spectators is to distribute 
equally among the two participants. This is predominantly the case when there is 
equality in individual earnings (panel C), but, interestingly, equal splits are also the 
most common choice when ex post earnings are unequal (panel B). Clearly, there-
fore, many spectators deviate from the ex ante position in their distributive choices 
and deem it fair to redistribute earnings ex post.
We also observe that many spectators make a distinction between different sources 
of ex post inequalities. As shown in Figure 1, spectators choose to equalize  earnings 
in more than 40 percent of the distributive situations where lucky and unlucky risk-
takers meet (panel D), whereas this only happens in fewer than 20 percent of the 
distributive situations in which an unlucky risk-taker is paired with a participant 
choosing the safe alternative (panel E). Thus, ex post inequalities between partici-
pants who have made different choices appear to be acceptable to a larger fraction 
of spectators than ex post inequalities due to luck (even in cases where people have 
equal opportunities and risk is avoidable). Finally, we observe that the share of equal 
splits in distributive situations where a risk-taker meets a participant choosing the 
safe alternative is independent of whether the risk-taker is lucky or unlucky (pan-
els E and F).
Is deviation from the ex ante position more frequent in situations where it is 
very costly for the participants to avoid risk? To study this question, we look at the 
level of redistribution by spectators in situations where lucky risk-takers are paired 
with unlucky risk-takers. In such situations, the total earnings to be distributed are 
always 800 NOK; i.e., equal to the individual ex post earnings of the lucky risk-
taker. Table 3 shows the share of this amount transferred ex post to the unlucky 
risk-taker. We observe that the fraction transferred is invariant with respect to the 
8 The corresponding Lorenz curves are shown in Figure A1 in the online Appendix.
Table 2—Distributive Choices: Basic Descriptive Statistics
Stakeholders Spectators
Mean share given 0.235 0.507
Median share given 0.125 0.500
Standard deviation share given 0.249 0.261
Share equal split 0.245 0.555
Share all to self 0.364 · 
Observations 530 283
Notes: The table reports basic descriptive statistics for both stakeholders and spectators, 
restricted to situations with positive total earnings. For spectators, share given is defined to be 
share given to the first person in the pair (randomly determined).
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value of the safe alternative: in all three cases, the unlucky risk-taker receives, on 
average, about one-third of the total earnings.9 Hence, spectators do not differenti-
ate between situations where risk is almost unavoidable and situations where the 
cost of avoiding risk is relatively small.
Overall, the data show that 71.7 percent of all distributive choices made by the 
spectators correspond exactly to the ex ante, ex post, or choice egalitarian fairness 
views. If we restrict attention to the distributive situations with unequal earnings 
(156 out of 283), where fairness views may be in conflict, we find that spectator 
choices are exactly in line with at least one of the fairness views in 60.9 percent of 
the distributive situations.10
To study further the ability of these three fairness views to account for the 
behavior of spectators, both at the population level and at the individual level, we 
formulate and estimate a choice model that allows for some random noise in the 
9 In Table A1 in the online Appendix, we show that this result holds if we control for individual fixed effects and 
only consider individual variation across the alternatives.
10 In Table A2 in the online Appendix, we report the share of decisions fitting each of the fairness views in the 
different distributive situations.
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Figure 1. Histograms of Share Given, Spectators
Notes: Panel A: Distribution of all spectator decisions, share given to the first person in the pair (randomly deter-
mined). Panel B: Distribution of spectator decisions where there are unequal ex post earnings, share given to the 
first person in the pair (randomly determined). Panel C: Distribution of spectator decisions when ex post earnings 
are equal, share given to the first person in the pair (randomly determined). Panel D: Distribution of spectator deci-
sions when lucky meets unlucky, share given to lucky risk-taker. Panel E: Distribution of spectator decisions when 
unlucky meets safe, share given to unlucky risk-taker. Panel F: Distribution of spectator decisions when lucky meets 
safe, share given to lucky risk-taker.
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decisions. This model also introduces self-interest considerations for stakeholders 
and allows us to study the extent to which the fairness views of the spectators and 
the stakeholders differ.
III. A Model of Distributive Choice
We assume that a stakeholder is motivated by own income and fairness when 
deciding how to distribute the total earnings X generated in the risk-taking phase,
(1) V(y; ⋅ ) = γ y − β f (| y −  F k |, X ),
where y is what a stakeholder allocates to him- or herself, and  F k is what a stake-
holder considers to be his or her fair income. The cost of acting unfairly is cap-
tured by the function f (| y −  F k |, X ), where we assume that f (0, X ) = 0 and that the 
cost is increasing in the absolute value of the difference between own income and 
fair income.
In the main analysis, we focus on a version of equation (1) that has been proposed 
by Cappelen et al. (2007),
(2) V( y; ⋅ ) = γ y − β(y −  F k ) 2 /2X.
The interior solution  y ∗ is then given by
(3)  y ∗ =  F k(i ) + (γ/β )X.
Hence, a stakeholder takes at least what he or she considers fair, or more, depending 
on how much weight the decision-maker assigns to fairness.
Stakeholders may differ both in the weight they attach to fairness relative to self-
interest (γ/β) and in what they consider to be a fair distribution ( F k ). Informed by 
Table 3—Redistribution When a Lucky Risk-Taker Meets an 
Unlucky Risk-Taker, Spectators
Value of safe alternative Average share redistributed
25 0.338
(0.041)
n = 41 
200 0.321
(0.045)
n = 36 
300 0.319
(0.053)
n = 18 
Notes: Share redistributed is defined as share of total earnings transferred to the unlucky risk-
taker. Standard errors are in parentheses. There were no distributive situations where the safe 
alternative was 400 NOK and both participants chose the risky alternative. This results from 
the random matching procedure used in the distribution phase and the fact that only seven par-
ticipants chose the risky alternative when the value of the safe alternative was 400 NOK.
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our analysis of spectators in Section II, we assume that the individuals endorse the 
ex post (EP), ex ante (EA), or choice egalitarian (CE) fairness view,
(4)  F EP   =  1 _ 
2
X, 
(5)  F EA   = x, 
(6)  F CE   = {  1 _ 2 X if  C i =  C j , x if  C i ≠  C j ,
where x is the decision-maker i ’s earnings and  C i takes the value 1 if the individual 
chooses the risky alternative and the value 0 otherwise.11
We assume that spectators maximize the same utility function as stakehold-
ers with two exceptions: for spectators, the first term is always zero, and the sec-
ond term is defined for the spectator’s preferences over the income of one of the 
two stakeholders in the pair. Hence, trivially, the interior solution for a spectator is 
to choose what he or she considers the fair allocation of the total earnings between 
the two stakeholders.
A. Estimates of the Choice Model
We assume a discrete choice random utility model of the form
(7) U(y; ⋅ ) = V(y; ⋅ ) +  ϵ iy ,   for y = 0, 25, … , X,
where  ϵ iy is assumed to be i.i.d. extreme value. For each individual, with a fixed ( F k , β ), the choice probabilities then have a simple logit form. We assume that β 
has a log normal distribution, such that log β ∼ N(ζ,  σ 2 ). Note that the random util-
ity model is formulated both for spectators and stakeholders, which means that we 
allow for noise in the choices of all the participants. More specifically, the estimated 
β captures the importance of noise relative to fairness considerations for both spec-
tators and stakeholders, whereas γ captures the importance of noise relative to self-
interest for stakeholders.
11 In Sections A5–A8 in the online Appendix, we show that our main findings are robust to other model specifica-
tions. First, inspired by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), we introduce other functional 
forms in equation (1) that only slightly change the estimation results. Second, we consider a generalized version 
of equation (2), introducing the possibility of a threshold in the fairness views. The threshold captures the idea that 
the participants might be concerned with securing everyone at least a minimum level of income, and, therefore, 
might allow choice egalitarian and ex ante fairness considerations to play a role only above the threshold. The esti-
mated threshold model provides evidence that some participants are motivated by threshold considerations in their 
distributive choices. Thus, some of the participants who are classified as holding the ex post fairness view might 
be willing to accept choice egalitarian and ex ante fairness considerations above a certain threshold, whereas some 
of the participants who are classified as holding the choice egalitarian or ex ante fairness views might consider 
the ex post fairness view to be appropriate below a certain threshold. The relative importance of the three fairness 
views, however, largely remains the same when introducing a threshold (Table A6), and the threshold model does 
not fit the data better than the estimated version of equation (2) (Figure A2 and Figure A3).
1407cappelen et al.: just luckVOl. 103 nO. 4
Let the vector θ represent all parameters to be estimated. The population share for 
each of the fairness views is the estimated proportion of the participants motivated 
by this particular fairness view,  λ EA ,  λ CE , and  λ EP . The likelihood contribution of an 
individual conditional on a fairness view  F k is given by
(8)  L i k (θ) =  ∫ 0 ∞  ( ∏ j=1 j  i    e V( y i j  ;  F  k , β, ·)   __   ∑ s∈  ij     e V(s;  F k , β, ·)  ) dF(β; ζ, σ),
where j = 1, … ,  J i is an index of the choices made by individual i,   ij is the choice 
set {0, … ,  X ij } for individual i in situation j, and  y ij is the realized choice in this situ-
ation. To calculate the total likelihood contribution of an individual, we weight the 
conditional likelihood values with the corresponding estimated population shares:
(9)  L i (θ) =  ∑ 
k
 
 
   λ k  L i k (θ).
Table 4 reports estimates of θ for both stakeholders and spectators. From specifica-
tion (1), we observe that each of the three fairness views gain support from a sub-
stantial population share. The ex ante fairness view appears to be the most frequent 
among the participants, accounting for the behavior of around 40 percent of the 
individuals. Still, a majority of the participants endorses ex post redistribution when 
ex post inequalities reflect differences in luck. Only a minority of about 30 percent 
endorses equalization of all ex post inequalities.12
In specifications (2)–(4), we remove, in turn, one of the fairness views. In each 
case, we observe a substantial reduction in the likelihood value, which suggests that 
all three fairness types contribute to an explanation of the observed choice patterns.
The estimates reported in Table 4 also provide strong evidence that spectators and 
stakeholders express the same fairness preferences in this experiment and that their 
choices differ only in that the stakeholders are also motivated by self-interest.13 The 
estimated population shares are very similar for stakeholders and spectators, and 
the restriction that they are the same cannot be rejected by a likelihood ratio test 
( p = 0.94).14 We observe that the estimated ζ is higher for spectators than stake-
holders, which means that the random element plays less of a role in explaining the 
behavior of the median spectator.
B. How Well Does the Estimated Model Fit the Data?
To study how well the model fits the data, we use the model to simulate and pre-
dict the actual distribution of data in different situations.
12 In Table A5 in the online Appendix, we show that the estimated population shares change only marginally for 
alternative specifications of how to include the strictly selfish individuals in the estimations.
13 This also suggests that the fixed payment to the spectators did not induce an anchoring effect in their 
distributive choices.
14 We report the population estimates for the pooled model used in the likelihood ratio test in Table A4 in the 
online Appendix.
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As can be seen from Figure 2, the model predictions fit nicely the behavior of both 
stakeholders and spectators. Thus, the theoretical framework of the present analysis, 
given by equation (2) and the three fairness views, appears in a robust manner to 
capture both the underlying fairness motivations of the participants in risk-taking 
situations and how stakeholders trade off fairness and self-interest considerations.
One possible concern about spectators in experiments is that they might not be 
sufficiently motivated, since their earnings are not affected by their choices, and 
that, as a result, their choices might exhibit more noise than among stakeholders. 
This hypothesis is not borne out in the data from the present experiment, as seen 
from the estimates and by comparing data and predictions for spectators in Figure 2. 
The moral incentives created by the distributive situations being real, therefore, 
appears to have been sufficient to motivate spectators in their distributive choices, 
which is consistent with evidence from other studies (e.g., Konow 2000; Charness 
and Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004).
C. Consistency and Classification at the Individual Level
In this section we examine how effectively our estimates can be used to clas-
sify individuals according to fairness views and how consistent spectators are at the 
individual level.15
15 In Section A8 in the online Appendix, we also use this classification to show that the fairness views identi-
fied in this experiment relate in a systematic manner to the participants’ self-reported political views. Specifically, 
those results suggest that subjects on the right wing of the political spectrum are more likely to favor the ex ante 
fairness view, whereas a larger share of those on the left wing make choices consistent with the ex post fairness 
Table 4—Estimates of the Choice Model
1 2 3 4
Parameter
Stake-
holder Spectator
Stake-
holder Spectator
Stake-
holder Spectator
Stake-
holder Spectator
 λ EP 0.274 0.302 0.499 0.501 0.356 0.412
(0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.092) (0.107) (0.120)
 λ CE 0.315 0.272 0.590 0.545 0.644 0.588
(0.095) (0.089) (0.090) (0.099) (0.107) (0.120)
 λ EA 0.411 0.427 0.410 0.455 0.501 0.499
(0.091) (0.091) (0.090) (0.099) (0.087) (0.092)
ζ 3.094 6.960 3.012 4.899 3.039 4.984 1.613 3.552
(0.503) (0.683) (0.488) (0.688) (0.494) (0.680) (0.590) (0.894)
σ 4.378 4.660 3.910 4.386 4.059 4.226 4.662 5.115
(0.655) (0.706) (0.566) (0.675) (0.595) (0.644) (0.644) (0.910)
γ 15.577 13.243 14.525 10.718
(0.509) (0.463) (0.496) (0.260)
log L −1,200.6 −606.5 −1,239.0 −623.1 −1,254.7 −676.2 −1,305.8 −697.0 
Notes: The specifications are estimated separately for spectators and stakeholders, where  λ EP ,  λ CE , and  λ EA are the 
share of individuals with the ex post, choice egalitarian, and ex ante fairness views, respectively. The expectation 
and the standard deviation of the lognormal β are parameterized such that log β ∼ N(ζ,   σ 2 ). The likelihood is maxi-
mized using the FmOpt library (Ferrall 2005). One population share and its standard error are calculated residually. 
Income is scaled in units of 1,000 NOK. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using the BHHH method 
(Berndt et al. 1974).
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We start out by using the estimates reported for specification (1) in Table 4 to 
identify the ex post likelihood of any specific individual holding a particular fairness 
view. Given an individual’s choices, we apply Bayes’ theorem,
(10) P(k | y, z ) =  P(y | k, z )P(k | z )  __ 
P(y | z )   for k ∈ {EA, CE, EP },
where P(k | y, z ) is the a posteriori probability of having the fairness view k given 
that the choice y is made in a situation described by the vector z. These probabilities 
can be calculated by applying equations (8) and (9).16
view. We take these results as favorable evidence on the external validity of the fairness preferences identified in 
this experiment.
16 The expression P(y | k, z ) corresponds to  L i k (θ) as defined in equation (8), P(k | z ) is the population share  λ k , 
and P(y | z ) is the total likelihood contribution  L i (θ) defined in equation (9).
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Figure 2. Actual and Predicted Share Given in Various Distributive Situations
Notes: Predictions refer to simulations of the model for stakeholders and spectators. The simulations are based on 
the estimates reported for specification (1) in Table 4. These are calculated with 1,000 replications of each individ-
ual and the distributive situations in which he or she is involved. Each replication is randomly assigned a fairness 
view  F k and β in accordance with the estimates. Panel A: Distribution of decisions when ex post earnings are equal, 
share given to the other participant (stakeholders)/ to the first person in the pair, randomly determined (spectators). 
Panel B: Distribution of decisions when lucky meets unlucky, share given to the other participant (stakeholders)/
to the lucky participant (spectators). Panel C: Distribution of decisions when risk-taker meets safe, share given to 
the other participant (stakeholders)/ to the risk-taking participant (spectators).
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Figure 3, panel A, shows how well the model identifies fairness views at the indi-
vidual level by reporting the distribution of the a posteriori probability of the most 
likely fairness view for each individual. We observe that a large majority of the 
spectators and a substantial share of the stakeholders are identified very precisely. 
The fact that the models are less effective in identifying precisely the fairness views 
of the stakeholders is mainly due to the fact that a substantial share of them took 
everything for themselves.
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Figure 3. Identification of Fairness Views at the Individual Level
Notes: Panel A shows the distribution of the a posteriori probability of the most likely fairness 
view for each individual, ma x k  {P(k | y, z)}, for stakeholders and spectators. Panel B shows scat-
ter plots of the level of consistency and level of identification for each spectator. Level of consis-
tency is measured by the fraction of decisions consistent with the most likely fairness view of an 
individual (restricted to distributive situations with positive total earnings) and the level of iden-
tification is measured by the a posteriori probability of the individual having this fairness view, 
ma x k  {P(k | y, z)}. Circle, diamond, and cross indicate that a spectator is identified as having the 
ex post, choice egalitarian, and ex ante fairness view, respectively. Calculations of a  posteriori 
probabilities are based on the main specification in Table 4.
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We can further study whether spectators choose consistently across distributive 
situations, where the level of consistency is measured by the fraction of decisions 
exactly in line with the most likely fairness view of the spectator.17 Figure 3, panel B, 
reports a scatter plot for spectators of the fraction of consistent decisions and the a 
posteriori probability of their most likely fairness view. We observe that most of the 
spectators are located in the upper right corner of the panel, which means that their 
fairness view is precisely identified and that they act consistently with their respec-
tive fairness classifications.18
IV. Concluding Remarks
Our experiment provides initial evidence that many people consider fairness in 
the context of risk-taking to go beyond equalizing opportunities, but it also reveals 
considerable disagreement on how to allocate fairly the gains and losses from risk-
taking. Many participants endorse the ex ante fairness view, whereas others endorse 
the ex post fairness view. Nevertheless, if we look separately at the two fairness 
questions, we find, on each of them, that the majority favors the choice egalitarian 
distribution. When distributing between lucky and unlucky risk-takers, most par-
ticipants find it fair to eliminate inequalities. When distributing between risk-takers 
and those who choose the safe alternative, most participants find inequalities in 
outcomes justifiable.
One should be careful when drawing general conclusions from a single laboratory 
experiment, but the findings of this paper could have interesting implications for our 
understanding of political debates. In the context of the financial crisis, for example, 
the majority view in the present experiment can be seen as opposing redistribu-
tion from those who avoid risk to unlucky investors, but as favoring redistribution 
between lucky and unlucky investors. Similarly, in the health context, where a key 
question is who should bear the costs of treatment related to risky lifestyle choices 
(World Health Organization 2002), the majority view may be seen as supporting the 
distribution of costs of treatment among all those with risky life styles; for example, 
by the government taxing products such as cigarettes, alcohol, sugar, and fat, or 
by insurance companies demanding higher premia from individuals who engage in 
risky behavior (Cappelen and Norheim 2005).
The current study might also be connected to the design of compensation systems 
in principal-agent situations, where there is a trade-off between providing  effective 
work incentives to the agents and reducing the agents’ exposure to unwanted risk 
(Sappington 1991). An efficient compensation system would create inequalities 
between agents who exercise the same level of effort but have different luck. Our 
results suggest that some view such inequalities as unfair even if the agents had the 
same ex ante opportunities and had voluntarily entered into the relationship. This 
perceived unfairness might, in turn, increase the level of compensation needed to 
17 It is not meaningful to examine consistency of this sort for stakeholders given the role of self-interest in 
their decisions.
18 We observe a few spectators located in the upper left part of the panels, which means that they are very con-
sistent but not precisely identified. This results from the fact that some spectators faced distributive situations where 
different fairness views justified the same distribution.
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attract agents to the task and affect the optimal structure of the compensation system 
(Desiraju and Sappington 2007).
The present study highlights the fact that risk-taking raises distinct questions of 
fairness by focusing on how to deal with risk-taking in a setting of equal opportuni-
ties. Important avenues for future research are to study fairness views about risk-
taking when initial opportunities are unequal and to explore how such views might 
depend on culture, institutions, and other contextual factors.
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